

New Republic

**George F.
KENNAN**

The Nature of the Soviet Challenge

**A new appraisal of changes in the
Kremlin and the impact of the Soviet
Challenge on Asia and the West**

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T. R. B. *Washington Wire*

Labor is important news—and not, for once, because of some major industrial dispute. There is a fluidity, a sign of possible changes in union line-ups following the death of Philip Murray and William Green. And behind the scenes, carefully planned by President Eisenhower's tacticians, there is a quiet but persistent Republican drive to split at least a large part of organized labor from its close but relatively recent alliance with the Democrats.

We've been thoroughly skeptical of the numerous dope stories predicting the imminent "collapse" of the CIO and a "new labor federation" involving David J. McDonald's United Steelworkers, now with the CIO, and John L. Lewis' United Mine Workers. It's a little ironic that the first real crack from previous relationships was unexpected and unpredicted, even by expert labor observers—the sudden angry bolt of Big Bill Hutcheson of the Carpenters Union from the American Federation of Labor.

George Meany, the able AFL president, met this challenge so fast that Hutcheson — the only union president ever to claim the right to make a son, Maurice, his hereditary successor in office — was bounced out of the federation's executive council before he could put on his hat.

Meany didn't even ask Old Man Hutch to "think it over." He remarked that a vacancy now existed in Big Bill's former office of first vice-president, asked for and got a motion to jump the other 12 vice-presidents one step forward, and promptly got the Teamsters' Union president, Dave Beck, named to fill the bottom vacancy.

Hutcheson is sore at the AFL Machinists who won't let the building trades get away with "backdoor" closed-shop agreements with construction firms that victimize legitimate, dues-paying machinists. He is sore at AFL maintenance-of-way railroad workers; apparently he thinks that wooden railroad ties give carpenters "jurisdiction" over maintenance-of-way operations.

So far as the CIO is concerned, it seems doubtful that 1.2 million rank-

and-file workers could be "pulled out" the way Hutcheson "pulled out" the carpenters from the AFL—without asking the members' permission. Meany and President Walter P. Reuther of the CIO, who have much in common as "modern" labor leaders, are making progress in their unity talks. They have a no-raiding agreement, and various AFL and CIO unions are signing specialized no-raiding and mutual assistance pacts (examples: AFL Machinists and CIO Auto Workers, AFL Butchers and CIO Packinghouse Workers). The labor movement is changing—but neither big federation is cracking up.

John Llewellyn Lewis, cranky as always when a situation does not let him appear as top dog, is making motions and getting his name in the papers. He confers with Hutcheson and the Steelworkers' McDonald. He goes to the West Coast and talks with AFL Seafarers' Union President Harry Lundeberg. He denounces the Meany-Reuther talks. A tremendous figure, Mr. Lewis, and a great labor leader. But if he had



returned to the CIO, which he built, before Philip Murray died, he would again have been president, and it would have been Lewis—not Meany and Reuther—who dominated events. The lost opportunity

must haunt him.

The political angle in the labor news is highly significant. For three years before his death Senator Taft worked hard to detach the building trades workers—who, with the teamsters, are the backbone of the AFL—from reliance on the Democrats. The gimmick: an amendment to the Taft-Hartley law letting the construction unions have a union shop in seven days instead of the current 30 days. The amendment is still pending, and it will be part of the eventual "Administration" program on the T-H law.

Governor Dewey of New York, a skilled political operator, has always labored to decrease the emotional attachment of union leaders to Roosevelt, Truman and other Democrats. In the White House another shrewd operator,

special counsel Bernard M. Shanley, has presided over Administration conferences on Taft-Hartley changes. What business, anti-labor Republicans and anti-union Southern Democrats will let Ike do remains to be seen. But Shanley and other Presidential advisers are trying.

A curious thing is that the American Society of Newspaper Editors has no Standing Committee on Freedom of the Press and therefore had to name a special committee to investigate editor James A. Wechsler's charge that Senator McCarthy's two closed-session inquiries of Wechsler amounted to attempted intimidation of the New York *Post's* anti-McCarthy editorial policy. Another curious thing is that only four of the 11 committee members agreed that intimidation and ominous interference with press freedom were involved.

The other seven members had varying opinions, ranking from the conclusion that the "danger" of such inquiries of editors was possibly substantial to the conclusion that it was slight. Yet the transcript showed that McCarthy repeatedly asked Wechsler questions that impinged on the *Post's* editorial policy, as directed by Wechsler—not on Wechsler's books in libraries abroad, the alleged subject of inquiry.

All of these editors would react vigorously if a judge tried to change his newspaper's policy through a contempt citation, even if, in the end, the citation was dismissed. It is not the success or failure of an attempted intimidation, but the attempt itself, that menaces a free press.

We can remember, too, when editors and publishers had no difficulty in spying a "menace" to press freedom if a reporter joined the American Newspaper Guild, a labor union. We can recall when they argued in courts and before Congressional committees that press freedom was infringed if they were forced to obey the child labor laws. But in the Wechsler case, seven out of 11 found their thoughts wandering. All honor to the four, headed by J. Russell Wiggins, managing editor of the Washington *Post*, and chairman of the special committee.

Noteworthy This Week

BEHIND THE HEADLINES

Lost GI's—The Price of US Diplomacy

SECRETARY OF STATE DULLES, by speaking out prematurely on the refusal of the Chinese Communists to liberate American "criminals," has placed the US in the position of impotently recognizing a breach of the Korean truce.

The last-minute Communist arrest of GI "reactionaries," as recounted in the stories of returning POW's, was described by Dulles as possible grounds for a renewal of the Korean fighting, but not yet sufficient grounds for speculation on the possibility.

This statement lowered the only club that the United States had been holding over the Red jailers, and gratuitously invited them to violate the truce terms. Immediately after the Dulles comment the Chinese blatantly announced their intentions: Radio Peiping declared that GIs found guilty of "crimes" would not be exchanged along with other prisoners. Dulles retorted that the Korean truce terms required the return of *all* prisoners seeking repatriation. Radio Peiping said the Communists were basing their policy on the Geneva Convention; Dulles again weakened himself by conceding that the Convention provided some basis for the Communist stand.

The State Department has since been busy patching up the American position that Dulles had vitiated. At first there was talk of a retaliatory imprisonment of some Chinese captives. Then Assistant Secretary of State Robertson declared that any withholding of prisoners by the Reds would be a breach of truce terms requiring review on the highest level. Meanwhile other American officials had their hands full correcting Dulles on Geneva. The Convention, these officials pointed out, stipulated that

1. No POW may be convicted without an opportunity to present his defense, assisted by qualified counsel.
2. No moral or physical coercion may be exerted to force a confession of guilt.
3. The accusers must notify a "pro-

tecting" (neutral) power of their intention to try a prisoner at least three weeks before the trial.

4. Names of prisoners must be announced.

There are, of course, prisoners whom the Communists would not dare return. American officers have appeared on Red propaganda films to confess, with outward calm, their "guilty participation" in biological warfare. Other American officers have lectured GI captive audiences on United Nations aggression and war crimes. The faces and identities of these unhappy automatons are known; their repatriation would give the world a new set of case histories on the technique of Communist show trials. But after the unexpected windfall of Amer-

ican blunders, the Communists no longer need feel secretive—as they did following World War II—about the living entombment of war prisoners.

The United States has come a long way since the days of indignation over the Bataan Death March. The horror of the Korean death marches eclipses Bataan; yet the cases against the criminals have been *nolle prossed*.

The horror faced by American "instigators against the peace" equals the horror that would have been faced by Communist "volunteers" repatriated against their will; yet the United States, which invested a year of diplomacy in a successful effort to obtain justice for Chinese prisoners resisting repatriation, has thrown away its diplomatic chance to obtain justice for American prisoners desiring repatriation.


"Regimentation" Wins

IF DWIGHT EISENHOWER told farmers anything last fall during the campaign it was that a Republican victory would end the "regimentation" which had chained them to their plows since 1933. The nature of this regimentation was never explained, but the only government controls authorized by law are marketing quotas, a device for cutting production when surpluses get too big.

Farmers in the Midwest stepped right up on August 14 and accepted "regimentation" by voting nine to one for marketing quotas on wheat which would cut their production next year by 20 percent. By almost any standards, the overwhelming vote for controls was a repudiation of the pious declaration by Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson that farmers must join the free enterprise crusade. Although the Administration remained officially neutral in the wheat-quota balloting, most farmers learned from the grapevine that Eisenhower abhorred the thought of controls even when the alternative was a cut of half in the level of price supports.

It is probably too much to hope that the results will also end the campaign

In Next Week's New Republic



REPORT TO STEVENSON

Have any lessons been learned by the Republicans, the American people and the Democratic Party while its standard-bearer was learning about the world?

Read what Wayne Morse, John Sparkman, Gerald Johnson and others have to say.

demagoguery about regimenting farmers, but meanwhile it is a victory for the liberal farm leaders, and especially James G. Patton, President of the National Farmers Union, who actively advised farmers to vote for controls and the 10 percent of parity price support which goes with that. The Farm Bureau Federation, in spite of the extreme importance of the issue to wheat farmers now and to cotton and corn farmers later, had no advice for its members—one way of telling them to vote against quotas.

Perhaps as the Administration reads these balloting returns it will stop commiserating with the regimented farmers long enough to come up with something worthy of the name of a farm program, or it might even decide to share some of the farmers' enthusiasm for the program it inherited.

The Rent Disaster

IT IS STILL too early for an accurate evaluation of the shock the country has sustained with the ending of federal rent controls, but there are indications that decontrol may rank with the tornadoes and the Texas drought as one of the year's major disasters.

In Chicago, more than 1,300 eviction cases swamped city courts in the first week of decontrol. In Cincinnati (released from local controls last May) rents jumped so high that they raised the national average for residential rent, as compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, by two-tenths of a percent.

In San Francisco, the Chairman of the City Board of Supervisors declared that some landlords are "going completely nuts."

At least part of the blame for the chaos must fall on Glenwood J. Sherrard, the Eisenhower appointee who directed the Office of Rent Stabilization during its final five months. Sherrard, owner of Boston's Parker House Hotel and ex-president of the American Hotel Association, devoted a major part of his energies to liquidating the stabilization setup ahead of schedule. By the time controls ended, on July 31, little more remained to be done in stabilization offices throughout the nation than to hang "Closed" signs on the doors.

The effect of Sherrard's action was to heighten the frustration of many landlords already chafing under controls. For in the last months there were fewer and fewer offices where applications for legitimate rent increases could be filed. The landlords had to wait until the dam broke July 31; after that they could recoup their losses—with interest.

Only two dubious recourses now remain to rent-gouge victims—appeals to the newly established "fair rent committees" and appeals for court action. The committees, which exert "moral" pressure on landlords, consist of landlords and their spokesmen. The courts in some states have the power to delay eviction for a limited time where "hardship" can be proven. (The hardship of merely being thrown out of one's home is not, of course, a legal hardship.) But tenants, dreading retaliation in the form of additional rent hikes or eviction, are

showing widespread reluctance to use either of the two recourses.

Optimists have predicted that rent increases will average from 10 to 15 percent. However, spot checks in several cities indicate that this prediction may hold true for upper-income groups only, and that low-income tenants may have to pay increases averaging between 30 and 50 percent.

The CP vs. the ALP

THE *Daily Worker*, official publication of the Communist Party, and Vito Marcantonio, unofficial spokesman for the Communist Party line, are quarreling in public. The subject of the quarrel is the "line" to be pursued by the American Labor Party, New York affiliate of the Progressive Party, in the upcoming New York City elections.

The background for the quarrel was foreshadowed in a report we carried in the *New Republic* on January 26, when we wrote:

The Communist Party of the USA has a new tactical line for 1953. . . . The new line consists of two directives: (1) Liquidate the Progressive Party. (2) Infiltrate non-Communist and anti-Communist organizations—from left to right.

In New York, this new line means: dump the ALP. To Marcantonio, no ALP means no political vehicle, since this is the party he officially heads.

The problem for the Communists is how to kill the ALP, since it polled the necessary 50,000 votes for governor in 1950 and is therefore legally entitled

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<i>Washington Wire</i> , by T. R. B.....	2	Eleanor Bontecou, <i>Security Program</i>	19
<i>Behind the Headlines</i>	3	reviewed by Merle Miller	
<i>The "Little" Frenchmen Revolt</i>	6	Marc Slonim, <i>Russian Literature</i>	20
<i>Two Scorpions in a Battle</i> ; editorial....	7	reviewed by R. M. Hankin	
<i>The Nature of the Challenge</i>	9	Jacquetta Hawkes, <i>Fables</i>	20
by George Kennan		reviewed by S. M. Fitzgerald	
<i>Our Common Concerns</i>	13	A. J. Arberry, <i>Legacy of Persia</i>	21
by Erich Ollenhauer			
Russell Kirk, <i>Conservative Mind</i>	17	F. J. Hoffman and H. T. Moore, 21	
reviewed by Francis Biddle		<i>Achievement of D. H. Lawrence</i>	

PHOTO OF OLLENHAUER BY J. H. DARCHINGER

PHOTO OF THE BRANDENBURG GATE BY FRITZ ESCHEN

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to a place on the ballot. If the Communists withdraw totally, Marcantonio is sole boss and there just is no telling what Marc, with his checkered career of deals and double-deals, might do with the party. Hence, the Communists remain in the ALP playing the mute to Marc's trumpet.

Although the American Labor Party has named Clifford T. McAvoy for Mayor, the *Daily Worker* has not yet declared its support for him. Marcantonio flew into print charging the Communist Party with interfering in the affairs of the ALP to swing support to Rudolph Halley for Mayor.

In reply, the *DW* states that it has "not endorsed any candidate for Mayor at this stage of the campaign." Then restating the "new line" of the Communist Party to get into the act—no matter whose act, so long as the CP can make some contact with the masses—the *DW* declares:

We have urged and will continue to

urge all sections of the labor movement, as well as the American Labor Party, the Liberal Party, the New Deal masses in the Democratic Party and liberal Republicans to find a united approach that will insure the defeat of Dewey-Impellerism.

The hungry embrace by the Communists of people they hate—who also hate them—is, thus far, just a load around a candidate's neck. Halley moved fast to shake the bear-hug. He announced:

This weekend, while I was visiting my children who are in camp in Massachusetts, Vito Marcantonio took advantage of my absence to throw a dead cat into my back yard. I'm now throwing it right back at him.

He has conjured up a quarrel with the Communists, which he never had in the past. Now he has visions of the *Daily Worker* in some way trying to help me. I don't know what game he is playing. But I know that I don't want any part of Marcantonio, or the *Daily Worker* or of the Communists or of any Communist-supported party.

Carthy's objective so much as to his methods.

Finally, there were questions about Anglo-American trade. Stevenson indicated that there were great difficulties in opening up US markets to foreign trade, but he went on to observe that American plant capacity had been enormously expanded and that when the demand for armaments fell, the United States would have to sell a great deal more abroad and that if she wanted to sell, she would also be compelled to buy.

Stevenson made one very competent appearance on television. The questions followed roughly the pattern of the press conference. Inevitably China was raised again, and Stevenson took the opportunity of pleading for more understanding in Britain of the American attitude to Red China.

In response to another question he confirmed an earlier observation that the prestige of America had declined in the world at large. He thought several things—not all of them discreditable—had contributed to this. McCarthyism, he believed, had made many people feel that America had lost confidence in herself. Dollar aid had created the problems of a debtor-creditor relationship and as countries emerged, with US help, from their postwar difficulties they began to chafe for "independence from America"—a thoroughly healthy symptom. Economic aid, he felt, must be tapered off rather than stopped abruptly like Lend-Lease, but a certain amount of well-placed military aid would have to go on for some time yet.

Stevenson came up to England's expectations. We should have welcomed perhaps a little more than we got of his wit, which cavorts so happily along the line where British and American humor meet. We could have done with more of his wisdom than questions and answers permit. He will return to Britain, we hope, and when he does he will certainly be received as a friend, for he is so obviously what we all like to think ourselves, irrespective of political labels—a liberal at large. We liked his personality. We liked his way of thought. Most of all perhaps we liked him for the last words he left us on his TV program. He was speaking of his Presidential campaign. Though defeated, he said he felt mightily rewarded, "because of the opportunity of seeing my country and of having intimate contact with the might, majesty and simple dignity of the American people."

Last Stop London: Stevenson Heads for Home



"HAVE YOU anything complimentary you can say about Senator McCarthy?" a London reporter asked point-blank when Adlai met the press.

The Governor jumped smartly to his feet. "Nothing," he said, "except that he lives in a beautiful state which is next to mine."

After that direct answer Stevenson could have hedged almost as much as he liked on anything else and got away with it. In fact he hedged on very little.

The size of his press audience was flattering. It was probably the biggest such conference we have seen in London since the war. The first question came from an Irishman who took 15 minutes to ask the Governor for his views on the Fogarty Resolution. The second, equally involved, came from a Ceylonese who wanted to know why the US had refused Ceylon's license to import a helicopter to spray sulphur on diseased rubber trees. Stevenson betrayed a trifle of surprise at these opening moves, but he answered the questions gently and patiently. No one recorded his answers—not even the gentleman from Ceylon.

Then the conference got down to

business. "Was the Governor in favor of admitting Red China to the UN?"

The Governor was not. "If you mean now—most emphatically not. Until I am more certain of the future purposes of Red China I would not feel there was any occasion for suddenly smiling on Red China and embracing her to the bosom of free nations whose objective is peace, on the very morrow of a war in which my country suffered 144,000 casualties in trying to protect security." Stevenson made it clear that he felt nobody should approach the question of Red China with a mind inflexibly made up. But he felt that if ever China was to be granted membership in the UN, she would have to work her passage. She could perhaps acquire the necessary merit by a constructive contribution to the peaceful unification of Korea, by withdrawing support from the rebels in Indo-China, and by using her influence with Russia to get an Austrian treaty signed.

He returned to the subject of McCarthy of his own accord and observed that there seemed to be some misunderstanding in Europe about the Senator. There are many people in the US, he said, who feel that something more should be done to arouse consciousness of the dangers of Soviet imperial designs. The opposition was not to Mc-

Paris Dispatch: THE "LITTLE" FRENCHMEN REVOLT

The wave of strikes in the French public services and nationalized industries—sudden, sweeping and remarkably successful—started in the first place from the unwillingness of men close to the very bottom of the economic scale—the humble letter carriers—to shoulder more than their share of the burdens of the franc-saving reforms which Premier Joseph Laniel's right-wing government was planning to carry out through use of "special powers" granted by the National Assembly. It very soon became, however, an expression of deep and serious discontent on the part of practically the whole working-class population of the country.


Reforms are, of course, necessary. They are in fact long overdue. The French Government's financial house is in scandalous disorder. Time and again the Assembly has refused to permit any start on the house-cleaning because some vested interest was able to make a deal with other vested interests for enough votes to block the project. But since August, 1951, the Socialists have not been in any government coalition. The working class has had, therefore, no direct representation. And when Laniel announced that he would use his "special powers" to remove the obstacles to reform, it turned out that the obstacle he meant was the "little" Frenchman who works for the government.

The French Government, it is true, has become the largest employer of labor in the country—and, not incidentally, one of the least efficient and modern in its methods. Reorganization was in order. But the sum of money that could be saved by penalizing the "little" workers was trivial compared with the sums that should have been saved by "decree" laws directed toward breaking the hold on the national economy of the big vested interests. The wave of strikes was an effort by the workers to veto the "special powers" for Laniel which a predominantly right-wing majority in parliament had voted.

From the international point of view, the effort presented certain disquieting elements of resemblance to the French past and the European present. The

Laniel "decrees" recall the Laval "decrees" of 1935, which caused the explosion in 1936—the abortive pre-Fascist *putsch* of the "February days" and the subsequent formation of the Popular Front bringing together the Socialists and the Communists.

Even more disturbing is the resemblance to some causative aspects of the recent East German uprising. The present wave of social agitation in France is quite definitely not Communist in its origin and meaning. It was no more caused by Communist agitators than the East German outbreak was provoked by anti-Communist agents. But in both cases, French and German, the immediate cause—worsening economic conditions of the workers—brought to the surface the deeper reason: rebellious antagonism to governments considered to be enemies of the working class. In East Germany, the spark was provided by the decisions in May of the puppet government—higher prices, even less consumer goods, more work for the same wages. In France the spark was the report (for the decrees had not yet been officially promulgated) that Laniel was planning to discharge some scores of thousands of civil service workers and to postpone the date of retirement by from two to seven years. As Georges Levard, General-Secretary of the French Confederation of Christian Workers (CFTC), the strongly anti-Communist Catholic workers' organization, explained:



There are two reasons for the success of the strike movement. The first is the decrees, the nature of which was deeply resented by the workers. The second is the growing discontent of the workers with regard to the social policies of this government and the ones which have preceded it . . . the workers no longer have any confidence in the men who are in power. Social tension will continue as long as the government continues its present policies.

The most serious element in the strikes is the claim of labor that it is the "legitimate" representative of the great mass of the French people and of its true interests. In terms of numbers of Frenchmen and of votes, there is no

question that the parties of the present Laniel coalition government fail to represent a majority of the people. Moreover, during the long parliamentary crisis between the fall of René Mayer and the advent of Laniel, it became clear that a government really representing a majority could be formed, perhaps under the premiership of Pierre Mendes France, of the left-wing of the right-center Radical Party.

Such a government, however, would not only satisfy the grievance of labor and take a New Deal approach toward domestic problems but would also move toward ending the war in Indo-China, toward weakening the ties with the Eisenhower Administration, and perhaps toward repudiation of the EDC. Although it would keep the Communists out of power, it would welcome the Socialists, and undoubtedly follow the Churchill "line" of cautious experimentation with negotiations with the Soviets for an end of the Cold War, or at least lessened international tension. To the extent that these attitudes honestly reflect a majority of French public opinion, this unformed government is the "legitimate" one of France; but to the extent that it has no official or formal responsibility, its claim to legitimacy tends to be rebellious and dangerous.

But if the Laniel government, defending the big vested interests at home and determined to go along almost all the way with GOP Washington's world policies, suppresses the "uprising" begun by the lowly letter carriers, the specter of France's prewar past—of the 1936 Popular Front between the Socialists and Communists—may conceivably return. Obviously, this—the creation of a Popular Front in opposition, if not in government—is precisely what the Communists want in France—and in Italy too. To the extent that pro-US French big businessmen insist on the tough line at home against appeasement of the Left, considering such conduct the necessary parallel of the US big businessmen's tough line against negotiations on the world plane, the victory for true democracy won in East Germany may be impaired by losses to Communism in France and Italy.

Paris

FRANK GORRELL

Editorial Two Scorpions in a Bottle



NOT LONG AGO, Dr. Robert Oppenheimer was briefed on the latest developments in atomic weapons and asked to consider new plans for their control. He decided that there was little hope of even a slow-down in the atomic armaments race. He concluded that for the foreseeable future world peace will rest on the mutual capacity of Russia and America to destroy each other in an atomic war. He wrote, *"We may be likened to two scorpions in a bottle, each capable of killing the other but only at the risk of his own life."*

What are the new rules for peace and survival in the age of the scorpion? We have barely begun to consider them. The sole outward reaction of our government to Malenkov's claim that his regime has mastered the hydrogen bomb is the statement of Lewis Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, that: "We have never assumed that it was beyond the capabilities of the Russians to produce such a weapon. . . ." This is our government's response to news which if true could mean the end to a civilization built over a thousand years.

Malenkov's announcement certainly does not transform the threat we face. For whether or not the Russians have the hydrogen bomb today they possess atomic stockpiles and a bombing force sufficient to kill or maim 15 million Americans in a single night.

Representative Melvin Price of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy estimates that the Kremlin now has 200 bombs and will have 400 within two years. Dr. Alvin Graves, Test Director of the Los Alamos Laboratory of the AEC, roughly confirms Price's estimate.

Each one of these Soviet bombs is 60 kilotons in destructive power; that is three times the power of the bomb that levelled Nagasaki, and would ruin an American city the size of Wilmington or Newark. To carry these bombs to our cities the Soviet regime possesses 1,200 heavy bombers that can take off from present Soviet bases, unload their cargoes and fly on to land in a neutral country such as Mexico. It possesses a growing number of very heavy bombers that can deliver the atom bombs and complete the return flight to Russia.

Sen. Stuart Symington, former Secretary of the Air Force, holds that four out of five of the Soviet bombers will be untouched by our present air defense under ideal

conditions, and that 99 out of 100 will get through in a night attack.

The danger is critical regardless of the hydrogen bomb. The advantage of the hydrogen bomb is that, unlike the atomic bomb, it has no upper limit in its size and destructive power. Its disadvantage is that its cost is equal to 20 to 30 atomic bombs. It takes an atomic reactor a year to produce the tritium needed for a hydrogen bomb. For this reason the US did not divert its capacity from the manufacture of plutonium until we had created a substantial stockpile of atomic bombs. The significance of the Malenkov announcement is probably that once again we have underestimated Soviet capabilities. For it suggests that the Soviet stockpile is now so great that the Kremlin can divert capacity to the manufacture of tritium.

Even if we move today to counter this threat, we may face two years or more during which we cannot stand up to Soviet diplomatic pressures because, while they possess the means of our destruction, we lack the means for our defense. But if we fail to act now to protect ourselves, the lesson cannot be lost on the Soviet leaders. World War II became inevitable when Hitler persuaded his generals that the allies lacked the will to defend themselves. Can we afford to assume that it will be otherwise in the Kremlin?

Soviet leaders have recently acknowledged that military conquest is a legitimate means of Communist expansion. Soviet strategists, while they criticized Hitler's concepts, opposed the *unsupported blitzkrieg* rather than the *blitzkrieg* itself. Their writings indicate no opposition in principle to air attack if the American continent is left open and unprotected as a continental Pearl Harbor.

IN ONE LINE of action, the US has moved energetically to counter this Soviet threat. We are spending \$750 million to extract uranium from the tailings of South Africa's gold mines. We have built tremendous reactor capacity—so great that the Portsmouth plant alone consumes more electricity than is used in all India. We have built with greater hesitancy a strategic air force of heavy bombers. We have established around the whole periphery of the Communist world air fields from which we can deliver thousands of atomic bombs.

And yet this effort is based on the unproven assumption that retaliation is an effective and adequate deter-

rent to a Soviet atomic strike. This assumption has barely been questioned, save by tradition-bound planners of the Army and Navy who reject the whole concept of an atomic war. Yet the deterrent value of retaliation has rigid limits. For one reason, a single air strike carried out without warning might be decisive today, leaving our strategic air force scattered around the globe, no longer supported by a thriving people, and an operating economy. Further, as the Kremlin must calculate, realists will conclude that no amount of devastation wreaked on Russia can bring back to life millions of American dead.

There is a second line of action to prevent a Soviet attack, which we have so far failed to take. It is the defensive deterrent—the interception of so large a proportion of the Soviet bombers that the Kremlin's atomic stockpile must be increased many times to produce the destructive blow it could strike today.

For six years after the bomb fell on Hiroshima our experts assumed that there could be no real defense. But, according to Dr. Lloyd Berkner, "Early in 1951 scientists close to military problems began to realize that a series of technological break-throughs had occurred that might make a sound defense reasonable and possible."

The first of these break-throughs developed in radar detection. The bombing lanes to the US are narrow and few from Soviet bases in the Baltic and the Arctic. Our scientists concluded that by building radar stations in depth along these lanes we can calculate exactly the size, the speed and the direction of the invading bombers, and give five hours warning or more to our coastal cities instead of the 15-minute alert that they count on today.

Given this warning system, the attacking bombers could be forced to run a gauntlet of interception 400 miles long, defended by piloted aircraft, supersonic missiles and guided planes too fast for pilots to fly.

The cost of a continental defense system built to counter present Soviet weapons would, according to Dr. Ralph Lapp, cost between four and five billion dollars over two to three years. In turn it could raise the interception rate to 50 percent and perhaps much more. But the program is not progressing. Instead the Defense Command relies on obsolete fighters flown by week-end pilots, the Strategic Air Command competes with the Defense Command for appropriations, the Army and Navy see themselves as the rivals of both groups, and the Administration is bent on cutting them all back in pursuit of a balanced budget.

The third line of action in deterring an attack is to reduce the damage caused by atomic bombardment through civil defense. Again, the federal program has been a dismal failure. It was allowed \$37 million, one cent in every \$10 for defense, for this year, and these expenditures achieved almost no results. The men who direct the program have been denied all real information concerning the problems we face. They fall back on the experience of Britain (which is almost irrelevant

in an atomic war) and limit their planning to glorified disaster relief. Meanwhile, in the eight years since Hiroshima, we have accumulated a stockpile of bombs, and at the same time allowed the target vulnerability of the United States to increase every day. We have permitted new factories to be built in coastal cities that are most exposed to attack. Our urban targets have grown as fast as the destructive power of the bombs. A program of tax incentives and selective pressures could have brought about the dispersion of new industry and the decentralization of new urban construction. But nothing has been done.


WHY ARE WE not doing more? The scientists trace our present lethargy to secrecy. No doubt they are right. The announcement of the Soviet atomic detonation was made in a single paragraph by our government and since then no more has been said. The guardians of our security, like Strauss, see secrecy as 99 percent of our problem, and education as one percent. The Russians, without doubt, know the size of our stockpile, the rate of our production, the nature of our bombs. And yet we withhold so much information that the Kremlin produces a bomb before our partner, Britain. Worst of all, we withhold it from the American people. Lacking information from the government, they discount the statements of atomic scientists as the claims of an interested group. They believe, as the study of the Social Research Institute of the University of Michigan proved, that all but a fraction of the Soviet bombers will be shot down.

The remedy, the scientists believe, is for the government to give the facts to the people that the Russians already possess: to state the rough size of our stockpile and the Soviet stockpile, to outline the danger, and thus to permit the people to determine what is to be done.

This, no doubt, is the first step. Yet in a democracy information alone is not enough. Leadership is demanded—and it is owed by men who assume the responsibility for government in these years.

When Eisenhower moved into the White House two major reports on atomic warfare lay on the top of his desk. One urgently recommended a major continental defense program; the other a complete reorganization of civil defense. They were followed by further reports. All were laid aside. Instead the Congress has been allowed to go home and the President takes a month's vacation.

All citizens naturally share a great stake in the President's health and well-being. Yet we cannot see how Americans are to be roused to greater efforts when the President and the Cabinet, with all the knowledge they possess, seem to be living in the pleasant atmosphere of the golden twenties. Why should Americans lie awake pondering the warnings of scientists who cry *peril* when the President assures us that the state of our defenses is such that none of us "need lose a night's sleep?"



The Nature of the Challenge

"The deepest duty of American civilization in the face of Soviet power lies still in the being, not the doing."

by George Kennan

THE EAST-WEST relationship as we know it today . . . is mainly the product of certain developments of the present century . . . most of which represented the final coming together of great historical movements, bound sooner or later to meet, to impinge on one another and to require accommodation. . . .

The first of these developments was certainly the rounding out of the expansion of the Russian state to a point where further expansion was practically impossible except at the price of conflict with some other great power. Hand in hand with this went the development of Russia into one of the world's major military and industrial powers. . . .

The second of these great historical developments was World War I and its effects both in Russia and the West. So far as Russia is concerned, the outstanding effect was of course the capture of power throughout most of traditional Russia by a group of men led by Lenin and inspired by the Marxist ideology as Lenin had developed it.

This meant that Russia had come under the control of men committed to a belief in the unsoundness and iniquity of the social system which, to one degree or another, all the other Western countries maintained. . . . The deplorable state of the people's languishing—as they saw it—under the yoke of capitalism was for them not just something to be noted and regretted: it was something they, as good international Marxists, as Leninist-Marxists in particular, had an obligation to do something about. The cause of the proletariat everywhere was their cause. They were the revolutionaries of *every* country, not just of their own. They challenged the legitimacy and usefulness of *every* capitalistic government, not just the one under which they happened to have been born.

. . . With that act, the exercise of internal power in Russia had become associated with a program aiming in effect at the overthrow by force of every Western government and the establishment in power in every Western

capital of a violent, embittered, defiant minority group, contemptuous of all real national tradition, challenging most of the accepted national values, hating almost everything their countrymen loved, amenable only to the discipline of the rulers of a foreign state. This was a condition without precedent in modern Western history. It belied the principle of "live and let live" on which the entire structure of international relationships in the Western world had come to rest in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It represented, from the standpoint of international custom, a retrogressive step: a throw-back to the religious wars of past ages—to the quest for universal secular power in the name of an exclusive and intolerant ideology.

At a happier time, at a time when Western society was in possession of its full strength and health, this sort of program and outlook on the part of the Soviet leaders might merely have been ignored and ridiculed and left to expose itself for the childish impertinence that, in essence, it was. . . .

. . . The real difficulty lay not in the control by these men of the resources of an established state but in the fact that they had come into power, armed with this amazing theoretical challenge to the soundness of Western institutions, precisely at a time when the West, generally, was abnormally sick and weak, exhausted and shattered by the terrible effects of World War I. . . . It was an easy thing for the Bolsheviks, with their glib and *simpliste* philosophy, to portray as basic weaknesses of the capitalist system things that were actually direct consequences of the great physical and spiritual debauch that modern war invariably represents, or part of the normal tensions of growth and change, made more crucial and painful by the effects of the war. The sparks thrown out by the Moscow leaders, supported by the emotional vitality of a primitive society, struck fire in many places in the tired, shaken Western world—wherever it was weak or divided or lacking in confidence in itself. In this way a curious bond was struck between the Russian Revolution and the tensions and discontents of Western civilization everywhere. Previously, the great countries of the West had been left to work out their internal trials largely in their own way, through the free play of indigenous forces, failure and weakness rendering

Mr. Kennan's article is taken from his opening address of August 10 to a conference on Soviet imperialism sponsored by the school of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University. The full text will be published by the Johns Hopkins University Press in book form.

them more vulnerable only against the limited aspirations of Western neighbors. Now, just at a time when the internal tensions were greatest, an external enemy arose—an enemy not created but self-inspired and self-declared—and so constituted as to take advantage of every centrifugal tendency, every element of self-doubt, every element of sickness or of weakness, in Western civilization. From that time onward, the germ of Communist oversimplification rode like a malignant bacillus, ever present, in the veins of Western society, powerless to disrupt the functioning of the organism so long as health and vigor were present, but ready to seize on the slightest ulterior weakness in order to poison, to disintegrate, and to kill. From the day of the Russian Revolution, the society of the West came to be haunted by a species of foreign demon, geared to take advantage of every gap between Western ideals and Western performance, implacably determined to make the West be all that it purported to be and live up to its highest pretensions, or to accept the horror of totalitarian rule by its own criminal elements in the interests of a foreign state.

Miraculously enough, considering the conditions of the Western world in 1918, nowhere except in Russia herself did society succumb to this demon in those ensuing years. Everywhere in the Western world, even in the new and untried states of Eastern Europe, health and strength proved sufficient to resist the virus. Communist parties remained, but they ceased to constitute in most countries any immediate revolutionary threat; they came more and more to be a sort of traditional fixture of the Western state: a curious receptacle into which there could be poured, decade after decade, all that fringe of the human species that tended by nature to turn against its human environment and to seek fulfillment of its own ego in the defiance of all that others believed and cherished. . . .

But as the ideological threat of Soviet power declined, the physical strength of the territory and peoples under Soviet rule began to increase. The ravages of the war were gradually overcome. Russia began to resume the march of economic and military development which had been in progress before World War I. In this way, with the passage of the decades, the Soviet leaders moved steadily away from their role as intellectual and political gadflies for the Western countries, and closer to the traditional role of Russian rulers competing for position amid the territorial and military rivalries of the Eastern European and Asiatic areas.

This situation might have existed for many years, and with no greater detriment to world stability than it had involved in the years of the nineteenth century, had World War I really settled the problems over which it was fought. But this was precisely what it failed to do. What people believed to be a settlement was actually only

a state of mutual exhaustion. The war had arisen from a serious element of disunity in Western society: this was the profound disagreement as to the place which the German people, having suddenly emerged on the European scene as a powerful and vigorous national entity, were to have in the European scheme of things. But since the war had *failed* to lead to any real political settlement on this point (and by that I mean a settlement roughly acceptable to both parties) and had only produced conditions bound to exacerbate the issue, the entire disagreement emerged again in the thirties in a new and more virulent and more horrible form, in the form of Adolph Hitler and the movement he headed. And in Hitler's aims and methods, marking as they did the most grievous disunity among the Western nations, attended by a readiness on his part to use force against the others, and coupled with the military weakness of the Western democracies, there lay the historic opportunity of which Moscow could hardly fail to take advantage. . . . For their inability to fight each other without invoking Soviet assistance, and their inability to refrain from fighting each other in the light of this tragic fact, both sides paid a price. That price was in large part the installation of Soviet military and political power over half of Europe

in 1945: and there is perhaps a deep historical justice in the fact that that price is being paid today in almost equal measure by the Germans and their Western ad-

"For the Western world the Soviet threat is not one of the power of ideas."

versaries in the recent war. . . .

I think it important to note that it was precisely this geographic extension of Soviet power that was the principal factor in making Moscow so much more of a problem to the rest of the world today than she was before this last World War. It placed her in command of the resources of Eastern and Central Europe. It gave her access to the advanced technology of that area. It served to overcome much of her congenital industrial backwardness. At the same time it lamed the productive and recuperative capacities of Europe generally, and rendered impossible the restoration of any real, political stability to the Western and Central European areas.

AND I THINK it important to note that all of this had little to do with Soviet propaganda or with the political appeal of Moscow's ideas. Moscow's aid was invoked or accepted by both of the Western parties in World War II on a basis of straight military power, in the most old-fashioned sense. And the gains that Moscow made by virtue of this advantage were primarily military, not ideological, gains. . . . Surely for the Western world in general the Soviet threat today is almost exclusively a physical one, a military-territorial one along traditional patterns, not one of the power of ideas. Starting from what was once a very favorable position, the Soviet leaders have succeeded over the years in divesting themselves

of all claim to moral and intellectual leadership in the Western world.

The same, unfortunately, cannot be said of Asia. Here the pattern is reversed. Scarcely anywhere beyond the northern borders of China and Korea does the Soviet Union itself today appear as a military threat to the independence of other people in the Asiatic area. But here the scene is marked by one of the most curious and important phenomena of our time: the appeal of Marxist thought and of the Soviet example, in particular, to people who have not yet come into the enjoyment of sovereign power or who are new to its exercise—above all, to people whose national consciousness and identity were formed under varying degrees of Western tutelage and control and who are now seeking to free themselves from the moral burden of this heritage. I think we in the West must face the fact that for a great many of these people the repulsion that Soviet realities hold for us is not operable in anywhere near the same degree. Their accumulated resentment of Western patterns is so great that anything that departs completely from those patterns is apt to appear commendable in their eyes by that very fact. The wastage of human life does not impress them. They are prepared to accept physical squalor and cruelty if they believe that it serves a social purpose. Soviet power is something that is more, rather than less, attractive to them by virtue of the fact that it has been accompanied by physical hardship and deprivation, by sacrifice of the interests of the individual, by a renunciation of precisely that conspicuous luxury, that physical self-pampering, that pretension to a pompous individual self-importance through which the Westerner has made himself hated and despised in so many areas of the world.

The Western world, and our country in particular, must be extremely careful how it deals with this phenomenon of the Soviet appeal to the peoples of the underdeveloped areas of Asia and elsewhere. We must take account of the fact that the past has left an emotional legacy that will not soon be overcome. We must realize that our concepts and example are not always necessarily relevant to the needs of peoples elsewhere. We must contrive to understand, as a normal human phenomenon, the fact that Asian peoples sometimes wish to do things one way precisely because it is *not* the way we do them—because they wish to demonstrate to themselves, and to reassure themselves of, an independence which is new and wonderful to them and in which they cannot yet fully believe. Finally, we must understand the impatience that causes many of them to reject the concept of free enterprise as the best means of achieving rapid industrialization and to look elsewhere for means to this end.

But with all this, they must not expect us to agree with them, or to encourage them, when they look precisely to Moscow for things they will certainly not find

there and, in so doing, place themselves and the security of entire geographic areas in jeopardy. It is one thing to ask of us in the West humility and understanding, a recollection of the mistakes of the past, and a tolerance for what is only human and unavoidable. It is another thing to ask us to affirm the reality of things we know to be illusions, and to acquiesce in changes we know to be disruptive of the long-term prospects for peace and stability. Americans can and should have understanding for a desire of other peoples to go their own way, even if it not be our way; but they can have no understanding of a desire to go Moscow's way, when they know too well what that has meant in practice to others who have entered on that path. No American can be expected to view with anything other than abhorrence the proposition that men are best ruled by lying and deceit, by appeals to hatred and suspicion and fear, by the destruction of religious belief, by the denial of moral obligation on an individual ethical basis.

To the extent that Asia manifests a revulsion to the West as a negative reaction to the experience of colonialism, and Western paternalism in the past, and wishes for this reason to strike out on paths of its own, we Americans must find within ourselves the dignity and

maturity to accept this, in the confidence that time will eventually develop a better appreciation of all values and a more balanced understanding of American civilization.

Even in the field of economic

theory, we must learn to be tolerant of approaches we firmly believe to be fallacious. But to the extent that peoples in Asia and Africa indulge themselves in the belief that Soviet-Communist political leadership can bring them anything else than the misery it has brought to all others who have experienced it—to that extent Americans must view these peoples as victims of a tragic and terrible naïveté, and must take this aberration into account when dealing with them.

People in Asia should be careful about rejecting these American feelings as the expression of some sort of selfish or imperialist interest on the part of the United States. . . . If people in Asia were to abandon themselves to Communist deceptions . . . the first to suffer would be these Asiatic peoples themselves. . . .

Actually, as of the year 1953, there seems to be reason to hope that the peak of this danger has passed. The real and decisive struggle in Asia has been taking place in the minds of men; and it seems to me that one can discern there a certain turn of the tide of battle to the favor of the forces of realism and common sense. . . .

These reflections are sufficient, it seems to me, to indicate that for the West, at least, the Soviet threat is only a function and expression of the West's own weakness. It was Western disunity that brought the Soviets into Europe for the first time as a military power capable of placing a temporary veto on the restoration of hope and

For Asia the Soviet appeal is powerful, but there is reason to hope that the danger may have passed its peak.

stability to the European scene. It was the tragedy of the Western impact on Asia—the long record of superficiality and selfishness and pretentiousness vis-a-vis impressionable and observant peoples—that made possible the neuroses and illusions on which Soviet influence feeds today in that area. A distinguished French scholar . . . once observed in connection with the phenomenon of domestic Communism that "error must . . . always be regarded as a crisis in the internal development of truth." It may be said, similarly, that for the Western world the Soviet threat is primarily an internal crisis in the West's own development. In this appreciation there lies, in my conviction, the key to the understanding of the correct method of approach to the Soviet problem. . . .

The Soviet regime, while embodying many traditional Russian features and now showing significant signs of evolution, is still the unique outstanding example of that nightmare of the twentieth century: the totalitarian state. This is in certain respects a new phenomenon in the inventory of political institutions. We do not yet fully know the laws of its development. Plainly, the edifice of Soviet power is faced today with severe strains and crises. These can be observed in its internal structure, which has come to depend on the institution of a supreme and glorified leader but contains no formal provision for the method of his selection. They can also be observed in the satellite empire, where the nature of Soviet power has been thoroughly exposed, where its devices have worn thin, where it is harvesting the crop of hatred and rejection it sowed with such reckless arrogance some years ago, in defiance of the pleas and warning of the Western world. It is our business neither to save it from its follies nor to confuse the issue by attempting to assert ourselves into its difficulties. If our own beliefs are sound, Soviet power will continue to suffer, as it is suffering today, by the effects of its own unsoundness—its incompatibility with the deepest human needs—and it will eventually earn the retribution it so justly deserves. It is important that this process be permitted to real itself with such vividness and clarity that for generations to come, and let us hope forever, men will not again be tempted to seek their political fortunes through the degradation of fellowmen. . . .

And as for the Soviet peoples, we can only stand aside, respectful of the ordeal they are undergoing, mindful of the real human sacrifices this has involved, careful not to bestow either praise or blame too quickly where we understand very little of what is going on, maintaining our readiness to be helpful to the extent that we can, when and if the opportunity ever develops. We must not underrate the human damage that has been done by 35 years of Bolshevism: the partial brutalization of the youth, the neglect of religious truth, the primitivization of political and social concept, the atrophying of the qualities of individual self-reliance and responsibility. If and when the Soviet peoples ever emerge from this long ordeal, we must not expect them to react like people who had never gone through it. In many ways, they will

be in great need of forbearance and understanding.

On the other hand, we must be careful not to approach them with an attitude of superiority and moral instruction. In their long and excruciating subjection to the power of human evil, they have unquestionably sounded depths of human experience beyond the ken or imagination of people in our world. Who knows but what, in the course of this ordeal, spiritual values have not been discovered—or rediscovered—of immense profundity, perhaps even essential to the healthy development of our own civilization? After all we, too, face a crisis at this time in the adequacy of our own spiritual concepts to the strains of our industrial and urban civilization. Perhaps those who have passed through the purgatory of totalitarianism will have something to tell us that we could not have learned in any other way.

Looking at all these things together, I cannot resist the conviction that there is some great historical logic in the existence at this time of the phenomenon we call Soviet power and in the problem it poses for the world beyond its own borders. To the West it stands as an admonition of the necessity for internal unity and mutual tolerance and a reminder of the immense moral responsibility that rests upon us by virtue of our rise to political and economic ascendancy in advance of other portions of the modern world. To the East it stands as an enticement and a test of maturity: as the bearer of something the Eastern peoples must have the strength to reject if their long-coveted independence is to be more than a new disillusionment and failure. As for the Russian people themselves and the other peoples of the Soviet Union, I fear the measure of their tragedy is now beyond our imagination or comprehension. On the great plains of Russia and Siberia, a moral struggle is in progress so immense that it must, it seems to me, be either the final demonstration of civilization's failure or the breeding ground of new spiritual forces of wide historic significance.

All of these developments stress, to my mind, the central feature of our age: the universal interdependence of mankind, which means that nowhere can men be entirely happy while human nature is still being mocked and tortured on other parts of the globe, but also that nowhere need men be completely desperate so long as somewhere else other men are trying to build a decent life based on the principles of charity and mutual responsibility. This does not mean we need lose ourselves in lavish schemes for world betterment by external action. There are many important things to be done; but example is still, after all, the greatest agency by which men help each other. To me, the prime moral dictate that flows for us from these realities is still the cultivation of the cleanliness and simplicity of our own national life, coupled with humility, respect, reservation of judgment, and readiness to be helpful within the modest possibilities of helpfulness, in our approach to others. The deepest duty of American civilization in the face of Soviet power lies still in the being, not the doing.

Our Common Concerns

The first policy statement to the U.S. by the leader of the German Social Democrats.

by **Erich Ollenhauer**

THIS CORNER of the world, this Western Germany that we call the German Federal Republic, is essentially friendly to the United States. The wave of anti-American sentiment in other parts of Europe and the world has not engulfed the Germans. It has not even engulfed important sections of the German population which oppose major policies adopted officially by the Federal Republic, largely, as they believe, at the instance of the Government of the United States. The Social Democratic Party, of which I am the chairman, is in opposition to the Government of Dr. Konrad Adenauer as a matter of legitimate fact in a democracy, and for reasons that relate to the home as well as to the foreign policies of the Republic. If these policies have appeared to conform with the policies of the United States under two administrations, we Social Democrats view that fact as a not unnatural consequence of the predominant position of the United States in the military occupation of West Germany since 1945. We do not indulge in resentment toward the United States on that score and we like to believe that we even understand the reasons for American reluctance to grasp the meaning and importance of German Social Democracy.

One obvious reason is the absence of a comparable pattern in the party structure of the two republics. We may have been disappointed but we were not surprised when the American authorities who came into Germany at the end of World War II were unable properly to place the Social Democrats. In repelling the endeavor of the occupying Soviet Power to enforce the merger of the Social Democratic and Communist Parties the Social Democratic Party battled alone without help from any side. The uncompromising stand of the Social Democrats saved at least the fifty million people of West Germany from the Communist infiltration which hamstringing Italy and undermines the position of France in the defense of the West.

We recognized at the time, and we recognize now, that the war had forced the Allies to do business with the Soviets. We Social Democrats do not dispute the reason, but we regret the illusions that were allowed to color the business and to persevere when the war was over. These illusions may have made it more difficult for the forces entering into occupation of Germany to give a hearing to the Social Democrats who have always

been consistent and unyielding foes of the Soviet, as well as of the Nazi systems. This conflict with American and Allied policies during the first years of the postwar occupation of Germany did not create unqualified respect for American, or Allied, insight into basic European problems, and we continue, with all due respect otherwise, to feel entitled to opinions of our own.

To us democracy implies ability to listen to the other fellow. We have every reason to be willing to listen to our American friends. Despite the above experience we have faith in their readiness also to listen, if we can only get within hearing distance. But you normally hear only what you are prepared to hear, and we admit that it takes some preparation to penetrate beyond the surface news and to grasp the singular stature of the Social Democratic Party, apart from its prominence in the party pattern of Germany, foreign as that must appear.

We began some 80 years ago as an organization dedicated to relieve the plight of the underdog in a despotic and in many ways politically chaotic, semi-national community. The latter circumstance forced us from the

Erich Ollenhauer, son of a Magdeburg bricklayer, joined the Social Democratic youth movement during World War I at the age of 15, and rose steadily through party ranks as a journalist and functionary. He gained note in the early thirties for his attempts to unify a left-wing



coalition crumbling between the twin pressures of Hitlerism and Communism. After the Nazis seized power he fled Germany to work with the underground in various European countries, until the advancing Nazi tide caught up with him in 1940. Shortly afterwards, influential French friends secured his release to England from a Vichy concentration camp. He returned to Germany in 1946, and succeeded the late Kurt Schumacher as chairman of the Social Democratic Party last year.

start to think in terms of getting a serviceable national framework. We still have not got it so the perspective has stayed with us, as of vital concern. When the Federal Republic of West Germany was created in 1949 this historic and practical preoccupation helped us Social Democrats to insist on, and practically single-handed to push through, a measure of constitutional authority for the Republic which its Allied and, in particular, its American sponsors were not happy to concede. Without that Social Democratic struggle in our constituent assembly West Germany would not today be a viable community and an at least half-way competent partner in international relations.


Such as it was and is the fluctuating Germany of our history could not operate, certainly not in freedom or within the world community, unless borne up by the approval and consent of the overwhelming mass of its citizens, including the under-privileged. Our role as Social Democrats was to be the political mouthpiece and instrument of the people who, in America, come together in trade unions, but who, over there, do not necessarily identify the trade unions with any one political party. In Germany before 1933 the major trade unions were, in spirit and in action, closely associated with the Social

Democratic Party. There were, in addition, denominational unions and unions with other party connections. Since 1945 the pattern has changed and the trade-union movement of Germany is a unified, independent entity with no party strings attached to it. But memories of the past persist and make understanding abroad more difficult.

Understanding is, perhaps, particularly difficult because we Social Democrats continue to function as the political spokesmen of the concerns which the trade unions represent in the industrial field. We believe that in fighting for social justice for their membership and families and for their alignment with the overall interests of the community, we are performing a service indispensable to the defense of Western civilization. An object lesson was provided by the Italian elections on June 7. The defection of the electorate from the governing coalition upset the balance of Italy's foreign relations. Of what avail are all the pacts, security agreements and joint military arrangements in which Italy participates, if they do not enjoy general support based on a balanced and accepted order of society?

Our situation is supposed to be different because of something called the miracle of German postwar recovery. Presumably the material satisfactions deriving from this recovery have eliminated privilege and created the millenium for all. There are overall figures to prove remarkable progress at least in production and trade. But the wherewithal of that recovery was provided, before recovery in today's sense was even dreamed of, by the people for whom we Socialist Democrats speak. As the war ended they set out with their bare hands and primitive implements to dig out from the rubble the tools and machinery without which recovery could never have got started. They had not, of course, been compromised by association with the fiends of Nazi terrorism and aggression, whereas their works managers, directors and stock owners tended to lie low and to look after their very personal interests. The workers and their trade-unionist representatives did not intend again to be dispossessed by the latter class. Although they did not proceed to attack the rights of property, they evolved and promoted schemes for workers' participation in management. Through their Social Democratic representatives in the Land (State) Parliaments and, since 1949, in the Federal Parliament of West Germany they won a measure of legislative recognition for these claims.

In one sector this recognition does not, however, provide the minimum democratic guarantees. The iron and coal mines of West Germany represent the major economic wealth of the nation and also happen to harbor the vested interests which subsidized Hitler with awful and untold consequences for Germany and the world. Representatives of these vested interests have now been financing sixth column operations within the political parties to the right of the Social Democratic Party, with unregenerate, one-time prominent Nazis doing the back-room work. The managers of the parties in the Adenauer



Balloting on September 6 will determine composition of the Bundestag (lower house), 484 seats to be filled. Within one month of election, the Bundestag will choose a Chancellor by majority vote.

Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's center coalition, seeking retention of its Bundestag majority, consists of Adenauer's party, Christian Democratic Union (present strength 151 seats), the Free Democratic Party (56 seats) and the German Party (24 seats).

Principal opposition group is Ollenhauer's Social Democratic Party (present strength 139 seats). Other parties not supporting Adenauer: the neutralist German Central Party and the "states' rights" Bavarian Party (combined as Federal Union with 21 seats), the pro-Soviet Communist Party (14 seats), and splinter parties, some of them extremist, (16 seats).

Splinter parties will be hard hit by a new election law restricting Bundestag seats to political groups polling at least five percent of the total vote. Only 1 of some 4 such parties are expected to qualify.

Voters will elect half of the Bundestag by direct ballot, half from proportional representation lists.

coalition have recently been trying to lay these ghosts from the tomb of Nazidom, at least for the time being. But the Social Democratic Party considers it a duty to the defense of Western freedom, to democratic principles and to its own constituents to press for more lasting guarantees against the arbitrary power of coal and steel magnates. It has drafted legislation for the transfer to public ownership of these massive concentrations of private economic power, measures which in German terms correspond to the principles and effect of the US Atomic Energy Act of 1946.

The merit of the system of democracy that has been developed in West Germany since 1945 consists in the provision of constitutional channels along which the underprivileged can press for recognition of needs and claims. The Social Democratic Party has from the outset accepted the implicit responsibilities. In five out of the 10 Land and City States which comprise the Federal Republic we are today in the government. In the Land of Hesse—of Frankfurt and Wiesbaden fame, a straight Social Democratic cabinet runs the affairs of a population equal to that of Denmark. In 27 out of 49 cities with a population of more than 100,000 the elected mayor is a Social Democrat. We are accordingly not a party merely in die-hard opposition to the federal government of Dr. Adenauer. We are a party accustomed to and ready for responsibility.

This will become apparent if we turn to the reverse side of the alleged miracle of (West) Germany's post-war recovery, the forgotten areas and the forgotten millions of the policy of so-called European, read: "six-nation," integration of the German Federal Republic.

It is presumably fully appreciated that Germany was partitioned, at least provisionally, between East and West in consequence of the Potsdam Agreement of 1945. When the Soviet Union turned against the proposals of Secretary of State George Marshall in 1947 the line of partition became a nearly impenetrable Iron Curtain between West Germany and 18 million Germans under the Soviet yoke in East Berlin and the Soviet zone of Germany. When the Western powers and the German Federal Government signed the General and European (six-nation) Defense treaties on May 27, 1952, the Soviet occupation authorities not only made the Iron Curtain fully impenetrable, they broadened it into a "safety zone" which further cut up ages-old communities in housing, farming, industrial, public utilities, rail and road, education, church and local government arrangements. A swath some fifty kilometers in width and stretching some two thousand kilometers all the way from the Baltic to satellite Czechoslovakia was affected on the west side of the line. Some seven million people living here constitute the forgotten men of West German recovery. They and their compatriots on the other side of the Iron Curtain are victims of what might be called the scorched earth policy of the Cold War.

Four West German Laender (States) have the direct

administrative responsibility for the areas involved on the west side of the Iron Curtain. In three of these Laender the Social Democratic Party shares government responsibility and in consequence knows the harsh truth of the alleged German miracle. At a conference in the frontier city of Kassel in early June the Social Democratic Party discussed the implications in unemployment, relief needs and laggard postwar reconstruction. We recognized that the problem could not be adequately handled with the means available to the Laender alone, particularly since the policies of the Federal Government tended to turn finance, industry, transportation developments and even tourism away from these areas. The geographical implications of the Coal and Steel Pool provide a case in point and the European Defense Treaty has made the trend explicit by defining these "frontier" areas as exposed and hence dangerous. At the Kassel conference our people in the Laender administrations contributed constructive proposals for the coordination of federal measures with local enterprise so as to frustrate what might become a policy of national suicide. An initial program of legislation and allocations was thereafter moved through the appropriate bodies of the Federal Parliament at Bonn and adopted at our instigation before the July adjournment.

I **CONTEND** that in pursuing policies of this description the Social Democratic Party is only serving the cause of Western civilization and the defense of Western values indirectly by promoting social justice; it is in literal truth strengthening the border defenses of the West. Our Mayor Ernst Reuter of Berlin brought home to his audiences in the United States early this spring the elements of this situation as they appear in Berlin, the one remaining gateway for refugees from Soviet-dominated East Germany. In the Federal Parliament we have been developing a constructive program of effective relief action for the starving millions there by way of credits on the interzonal trade balance to be used for food deliveries from West Germany. We gained parliamentary approval in early May. Instead of pressing forward with this program for German self-help Chancellor Adenauer recently made a spectacular if somewhat belated appeal for American aid. I appreciate the generosity of the American response but suggest that our proposals were better timed and, as approved by Parliament, may have given heart to our compatriots on the other side, thus contributing to that momentous demonstration of resistance and independence which will forever be linked with Berlin and the date of June 17, 1953.

The impact of the events that have their historic focus in that date now extends to the highest circles and we Social Democrats acknowledge the adoption of a goodly measure of our arguments and claims by the very best people. It is now recognized officially by the powers that German reunification is a pressing as well as a cardinal problem. It is recognized that the complications of the continued foreign occupation of Germany require con-

sultations between all four occupation powers if that problem is to be resolved. It has finally been recognized that some initiative in the matter is in order; it is no longer considered adequate merely to wait for a response from Moscow to a note, or identic notes, served by three of the occupying powers on the fourth in the dim past of September, 1952. An invitation to talks on the German problem has now been issued. We would have appreciated official recognition in the process of a long-standing Social Democratic contention in this respect, reworded as follows in an editorial of the *Times*, London, on July 21: The thing most to avoid is a long argument about the agenda.

WE HARBOR no illusions about the proposed consultations, whenever, however and on whatever assumptions they may get going. But we continue to insist that the path of consultations relevant to the problem must be taken and taken again. As I write, the cease-fire agreement has been signed in Korea. The event brings to mind a statement I made to the biennial conference of my party at Dortmund on September 25 of last year: Why could not the policy of patience followed by the United States in the armistice negotiations in Korea be applied in Europe as well? After all we have here a situation in which the fate of eighteen million inhabitants of the Soviet zone of Germany is at stake, eighteen million who must be liberated, eighteen million prisoners of the Cold War.

The Anglo-Saxons have taught us the virtues of the open mind. Rarely was this principle expressed more forcefully or at a more crucial moment than in the statement of Prime Minister Churchill before the House of Commons on May 11. We do not attach too much importance to certain technical implications in his statement. We have doubts about the applicability of the pattern of the 1925 Locarno agreements to present circumstances. It presupposes and implies an independent and viable Germany which does not yet exist. It makes no sense if twisted into a non-aggression agreement between the Soviet bloc and a supra-national European community which does not exist, even within the projected six-nation framework.

In the new phase of international affairs that is now dawning the use of the open mind must include recognition of the need for a broad popular basis for whatever solutions and agreements are projected. They will be the handiwork of statesmen, diplomats and, possibly, military men, but they will not be workable if conceived and consummated mainly on high-level technical assumptions. In West Germany a parcel of treaties has been forced through Parliament which is popularly and officially associated with something called the European Defense Community and which is opposed in the present form by that solid section of the community which the Social Democratic Party represents. I doubt that the extent and impact of the opposition has percolated to the

American world. The merits of the opposition have certainly not percolated. No words of mine can remedy that situation in this context, but I suggest the following simple test: Compare the positive response to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 with the unending birth pangs of the European Defense Community. The assembly of nations in the former has obviously carried conviction whereas the six-nation project is an equally obvious makeshift.

The Social Democratic opposition is, however, based on broader conceptions. Consistently concerned with the defense of freedom the party seeks means of defense that will rally the whole nation, not just a ruling segment and not only the Germans on the west side of the Iron Curtain. German integration into the defense order of the West can be successful only if everything possible has been done, with or without ultimate success, to reunite the nation in political fact. In that respect a move has now finally been made by the Western invitation to Moscow. Whatever the outcome of that move German integration into the West cannot mean subordination within an arbitrary slice of Western territory as specified in the European Defense treaty. We certainly want co-operation and co-ordination with the signatory countries, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, France and Italy but in a broader European framework embracing Great Britain and Scandinavia. We believe, in any case, that the work of the European successor organizations to the Marshall Plan, and of the European subsidiaries to the United Nations, is a better measure of progress toward an organized European community than projects that are European mainly by label. We have in any case declared our support for a security system based on equality of rights with a Council of Ministers as the supreme authority in Europe and with far-reaching integration in military, technical and armament matters.

IT IS NOW generally accepted that the social anchorage of democracy is on a level with that of military defense. The combination relates to basic concerns common to our two republics. As we understand it your great commonwealth has grown, historically and in human terms, out of a basic concern for the underdog. The Point Four Program for the underdeveloped territories of the world and even some problems peculiar to United States foreign policy today would seem to show how pervasive this concern continues to be in the American way of thinking. Out of this understanding we Social Democrats were among the first to welcome and to support the Marshall Plan. We focus our own international thinking in the United Nations which we look upon as largely an American creation in its denial of big-power monopoly of international affairs, in the range of its membership and specialized agencies. We Social Democrats subscribe to this approach and feel that differences of opinions and policy, such as they are, are no more than differences within the family of freedom-loving peoples.

LITERATURE AND THE ARTS

THE BLUR OF MEDIOCRITY

by Francis Biddle

MR. KIRK'S "prolonged essay in definition" examines the philosophy of British and American conservatives for the last century and a half, from Burke to Santayana. He lists half a dozen principles of conservative thinking: Belief that a divine intent rules society; affection for variety as distinguished from uniformity; conviction that civilized society requires orders and classes; persuasion that property and freedom are inseparable; faith in prescription (the customary right growing out of agreements of many generations), tradition, and "sound prejudice"; and a distrust of change and innovation.

These attitudes are found in greater or less degree in the conservatives whose thought he examines: Burke, with his uncalculated loyalty to the past, and his

THE CONSERVATIVE MIND, by Russell Kirk (Regnery; \$6.50).

hatred of abstractions, who so greatly influenced John Randolph of Roanoke; John Adams, the truest of the Federalists, who too put practical considerations above theory; the Romantics—Walter Scott and Coleridge; John C. Calhoun, who, before Lord Acton's famous aphorism, had written that "irresponsible power is inconsistent with liberty, and must corrupt those who exercise it"; Macaulay, Fenimore Cooper, "belligerently American, unsparingly critical of Americanism"; the New Englanders, fighting a losing battle for the place of sin in the universe, J. Q. Adams, who, like a true New Englander, felt that "his relationship to the Omnipotent was a matter of contract"; Orestes Brownson who finally embraced Roman Catholicism when he came to realize that Protestantism could not sustain liberty, because "it is itself subject to popular control"; Nathaniel Hawthorne, who impressed upon an already skeptical nation the dogma of original sin and the devil within us. So different in temperament were their English contemporaries,

Disraeli, with his "baroque imagination," Cardinal Newman, with his insistence on authority as against private judgment—true liberty was to live within the "compass of God's ordinances"; J. F. Stephens, who believed that force, not discussion, bound men together; Sir Henry Maine, the great legal historian and scholar.

Finally, by the beginning of the First World War, it was surprising that a bored and luxurious society, with great wealth and great poverty, without true leisure or "modest private security," could produce the most substantial body of philosophic and literary criticism in American history. Irving Babbitt, Paul Elmer More, and George Santayana are chosen from this group, to my mind the most interesting selections of any: Babbitt, who insisted that in our time the task of the humanist was to remind society of its spiritual reality; More, deeply conscious of the decay of humanistic intellectual discipline; Santayana, "a blend of aesthetic Catholicism with skepticism" and his "cosmic urbanity," who was convinced that liberty and prosperity could not be enjoyed at the same time.

Disregard of conservative principles, steadily increasing since the French Revolution, have brought about, according to Mr. Kirk, the present "consumptive society, so near suicide . . . the conflagration of unchecked will and appetite." His picture of American society is not attractive:

A society dominated by hazy sentimentality and concrete appetite, waking to knowledge of its own awful strength, ready to patronize or to lord it over the rest of the world, afraid of responsibility, impatient of admonition . . .

its contribution to the future civilization "cheapness, the cheapest music, and the cheapest comic-books and the cheapest morality that can be provided." Tocqueville's famous prophecy has, he believes, come about—"an innumerable

multitude of men, all equal and all alike incessantly endeavoring to procure the petty and paltry pleasures with which they glut their lives." This is the picture, I believe, of America today in the minds of many Europeans, to whom the difference between such a levelling economic imperialism, as they think it to be, and the military imperialism of Russia, offers no choice to insure the humanist culture of the West, and results in negativism. It is not a true picture. Yet there are elements of truth in it which cannot be disregarded.

Tocqueville's prophetic insight, his rare combination of an aristocratic instinct for quality with a sensitive understanding of the wretched condition of most human beings gave him an objectiveness in approaching this new adventure in democracy, which was still held in contempt by most Europeans, which raised the scope of his understanding criticism to a level which other philosophers of American society have never reached. Kirk calls him "the best friend democracy ever has had, and democracy's most candid and judicious critic." Lord Acton said of him that he was always wise and right, and "as just as Aristides." The tyranny which Tocqueville dreaded, the new tyranny of the democratic process, was the rule of mediocrity, under which men are kept in perpetual childhood, which "gives to all their passions a sort of family likeness" (Lord Bryce was to find the same likeness a half a century later). The "virtuous materialism" thus established enervates rather than corrupts the soul.

Tocqueville accepts the growth of democratic institutions as inevitable, ordained by a divine Providence. Yet the despotism innate in democratic power must be resisted, and its causes understood: the tendencies to over-simplify, to centralize and to standardize.

When we examine the content of most conservative thinking described in this volume the vagueness of its substance and the confusion of its ideal emerge with greater emphasis, set against this extraordinary Frenchman's analysis. Put very simply, most of it dates. Take, for example, Mr. Kirk's summary of con-

servative principles. The assertion that conservatives believe that divine guidance must rule a civilized society implies that liberals are excluded from sharing such a faith, and indicates that those who would preserve the society which they have enjoyed, in most cases as members of a privileged group, assume that God is on their side without taking the trouble to discover whether they are on his. They distrust the skeptical, in essence the critical approach which the liberal welcomes, because it challenges the authority which the conservative admires as long as it is exercised by members of his own class. But the liberal does not reject faith in divine guidance but believes that faith is a matter of individual judgment, and has no place in a democratic state of which an essence, culled from the bitter experience of religious wars, is that State and Church should function each in its sphere, and that what is God's should not be rendered to Caesar—at least the American essence. For even if belief in divine intent rules society—which may be doubted in the contemporary world—the discovery of that intent remains a human task, necessarily involving human disagreement.

Nor do I believe that affection for variety as distinguished from uniformity is an attribute confined to the conservative heart. The marrow of the liberal faith, of the individualism which Mr. Kirk so dislikes, was the freeing of the individual from the bondage of authority and misery which had been his usual lot without much variance along the generations. That at least was the ideal of the men who fought the Revolution and wrote the Constitution, even if their successors have not achieved a closer reality. "Those who won our independence," wrote Mr. Justice Brandeis a quarter of a century ago, "believed that the final end of the state was to keep men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means."

The conviction that civilized society requires orders and classes I am disposed to leave to the conservative. It really comes down to a preference. And in contrasting the present state of American society to, let us say the England between the outburst of the Terror in Paris in 1792 and the first Reform Bill

in 1832, the England that Burke did so much to preserve and to restrict, it must be remembered that the scales will tip in the direction of the individual making the comparison. Is it a better world for the workingman, for the vast class of the people, even if it is streaked with vulgarity and mediocrity, than the world of the Middle Ages, of Chartres Cathedral, of the Virgin, not the Virgin of Henry Adams but of the peasant who created the glory of Her image because the life that would come with Her in Paradise would forever replace the thin, grovelling human life that was his on earth?

I cannot put our world against any other period and say flatly men were then happier, the essence of life was richer and more beautiful. But such a reflection need not deter one from recognizing the tendencies toward uniformity and mechanism which threaten us today. And even if they result from the levelling processes of modern society, the equalitarianism which Mr. Kirk so generously detests, I am not prepared to admit that the extreme poverty and extreme riches of an earlier world, the very basis of the class society which Mr. Kirk's Conservative would have us restore, is a price worth paying.

I suppose all this is a matter of degree and of the choice at any given time and place; so that other principles of the conservative, which can be grouped together, faith in prescription and tradition and a distrust of change, could be more easily defended in contemporary America, for instance, than in Egypt or India, where tradition has stood still for many thousand years, and the ancient glories have long ago departed, while the conservative traditions ineluctably remain.

The men whom Mr. Kirk discusses are an extraordinarily diversified and interesting group. Yet sometimes their dish of conservative thought tastes curiously flat, without much spice or variety. The eighteenth century philosophy of a class society, built on a world which has long since disappeared, against the background of a secured leisure and an accepted hierarchy, dates like some smooth performance of *Candide* or *The Cherry Orchard*. It has the nostalgic unreality of so much of contemporary American intellectual conservatism, of T. S. Eliot, that "partisan of a graded society," of Allen Tate, of Peter Viereck, who seems to have little

to offer to nourish or cultivate the wasteland which surrounds them.

They can see the forces of an unlimited industrialism at work in a civilization caught in a mechanical spin; but they can suggest no substitute of philosophy or of symbols, blaming democracy for men's sins against the spirit, hating the "barbarian nomads," as Eliot calls them, largely because they have ventured to overrun those preserves which in the world they would like to reconstruct were reserved for the elite. Unless you blame democracy for the discovery of modern power, to equate it with the destructiveness of that power is like thumbing your nose at the Universe because you don't like it.

This confusion becomes more evident when we consider the development of political conservatism in the United States. It has become identified with the business interests and, as Babbitt shrewdly pointed out, aims to conserve property for its own sake, and not like Burke as a support of personal liberty. The identification of business man and political conservative has long since become so complete that it is hard to remember any conservative statesman in the true sense since John Randolph or John Quincy Adams. And the business mind, cautious of speculative thought, suspicious of political change, disliking theory, is by no means conservative where business is concerned, but notoriously daring and imaginative.

So that if the mad rush of the modern world, uprooting the long established traditions and prescriptions of a settled society, was what Burke and Randolph recognized as the threat of their times—and how much more today—paradoxically the Conservative, the American business man, is responsible for it, developing and encouraging speed and change without the control of any moral standard or political principle. Conservative leadership in terms of those restraints has disappeared from American public life, as can readily be seen if we compare the late Senator Taft to J. Q. Adams.

Of course the conservative instinct, now particularly needed, has not disappeared, nor have those symbols which, better than any definition, express its soundness and its depth; the symbol, for instance, of the land, particularly in the South, where for so many men a relation to the land is no longer pos-

sible. Yet the needs and the faith to which the symbols gave content have changed, some disappearing, many not yet readjusted; but the symbols have not altered and so have become unreal and can no longer move men to sacrifice.

A purpose to which the conservative—the instinctive yet thoughtful conservative—is particularly fitted, is to recreate those symbols which reflect his own faith. This was strikingly illustrated by the way in which Americans reacted to the recent coronation. The Queen was far more than a token of royal prerogative, indeed she was not that except in the outer trappings: she was the link with a splendid past, a bridge between the tradition of a thousand years and the new world of shattering readjustment; she held her people together and stirred their pride and love and sense of humility as no words could have done. Property seems to be the only symbol which American conservatives of the twentieth century can offer a spiritually hungry people—property, raised to the dry religion of free enterprise as the only way of life.

If the conservatism of the eighteenth and nineteenth century dates when it is applied to the United States of the Reconstruction and two World Wars, it has a core of human common sense that liberals of today would often benefit by following: that change for the sake of change has no virtue; that gratifying a "moral" impulse by unloading it into a law is an example of that sort of mischief (I have in mind, of course, the Prohibition Act, but it would not be unfair to apply the approach to most regulatory statutes, carefully weighing their workability before becoming too enthusiastic); that the roots of men run deep and far and must not too readily be cut; that the unrestrained play of the free market may be no longer useful to all aspects of our American World (in its name do we have to turn over the immense educational and cultural resources of television to exploitation by that market, as we have turned over radio?); that better democracy is more important than more democracy, a consideration which might have moved the Board of Americans for Democratic Action to hesitate before it went on record as approving the enlargement of the franchise to begin at eighteen years.

The end of the true conservative as well as the liberal should be the development of human beings. I do not think

Burke would question that end, much as he hated the idea of absolute individual liberty. The contemporary liberal should also know something more of the past, particularly of his own past; and if he cannot be moved by the theological acceptance of original sin, he can certainly accept the healthy reality of evil, now clothed in the psychological garment of the ego and the id, that source of instinctive if uncurbed energy, and realize, unlike Emerson, that evil is a very potent factor, without abandoning any more modern theory as to its nature and causes. And the liberal can afford even more than the conservative to go back to some of the beliefs of his eighteenth century progenitors—caution and a shaft of skepticism should temper his too easy enthusiasms in a world which remains irrational even while he must seek to make it follow reason; and both liberal and conservative may come to realize that freedom does not mean irresponsibility; and to insist that a striving for equality of opportunity need not conduce uniformity.

HYSTERIA DOCUMENTED

MISS BONTECOU's is the seventh of eight volumes made possible by a Rockefeller grant to Cornell University; their enviable purpose is to show "the impact upon our civil liberties of current governmental programs designed to insure internal security and to explore and control dis-

THE FEDERAL LOYALTY-SECURITY PROGRAM, by Eleanor Bontecou (Cornell; \$5).

loyal or subversive conduct." Of the five I have read, Miss Bontecou's, excepting only Walter Gelhorn's *Security, Loyalty, and Science*, seems to me the clearest, and, by all odds, the most sensible.

Some time in the future all eight of the books (the last is not yet published) ought to be immensely valuable documents for those historians who will want to record the sad hysteria of the 1950s. At the moment, however, there is almost no chance at all for much improvement in the areas examined, particularly the Federal Government's loyalty-security program. In fact, the standards of justice have, with no perceptible protest, deteriorated considerably since Miss Bontecou's book went to press in January.

We are, she recognizes, living in a

time of what McGeorge Bundy has called "a grim and illiberal public mood." Not even a Democratic victory in November 1956 is likely to have much effect on that.

What Miss Bontecou has tried to do—and done well—is to warn us:

If the tensions of the time demand some temporary sacrifice of basic freedoms, let us never forget that their maintenance is as necessary to national security in a free democratic society as is the protection of our physical safety; let us never accept the sacrifice with complacency.

She begins her study with Section 9-A of the Hatch Act, which forbade any Federal employee to belong to any organization advocating the overthrow of our constitutional government and explains the reasons for but does not necessarily approve President Truman's Loyalty Order. She is aware of the difficulties of enforcing such a program justly; she has written an admirably restrained chapter on the values and deficiencies of FBI investigations and investigators; she feels strongly about the Attorney General's lists of subversive organizations and makes a convincing case against the methods by which they have been arrived at and issued; she is aware, on the personal level, of the terror and injustice to which some innocent employees have been subjected as well as the effect of the program on government efficiency as a whole. At the same time, she realizes:

... with all its faults the loyalty-security program has at least provided a forum in which an innocent person may promptly meet any allegations made against him, with reasonable certainty that his case will be thoroughly explored. . . . Speaking mathematically, the chances are that in the end his record will be cleared.

Miss Bontecou concludes her book with a chapter on the study she made in 1950 of British loyalty-security practices. Actually, it does not seem much fairer than our own, although, "both the Government and the advisory board have acted with moderation and good sense, and with a continuing realization of the possible impact of the policy on the liberties of the individual." In this country, that has not always been the case.

Miss Bontecou writes so well and the problem she discusses is so basic that her book ought to have a huge audience. It probably won't get one; outside of Washington, D. C., nobody seems to care much about the security-loyalty program any more.

MERLE MILLER

UTILITARIAN TRADITION

Modern Russian Literature—the sequel to *The Epic of Russian Literature: From Its Origins Through Tolstoy*, published in 1950—is Mr. Marc Slonim's critique of the evolution of Russian letters from the latter decades of the nineteenth century to the present day. The evaluation is balanced and objective, the documentation comprehensive. Cognizant of the

MODERN RUSSIAN LITERATURE, by Marc Slonim (Oxford; \$6.80).

role which Russian literature has played as the supreme vehicle for conveying national thought and aspirations, Mr. Slonim has wisely endeavored to present an extensive picture of the social, economic and political trends—both in events and in ideas—which this literature has expressed and which have influenced literary styles and credos.

The history of the Russian intelligentsia constitutes the organizational framework of the book. Commencing his survey with the zealous consecration of the

"A provocative and truly disturbing book that should be read before asserting an opinion of Hiss' guilt or innocence . . .

"Reading the Earl Jowitt's pithy comments on American courtroom practices—as compared with those followed in Britain—has disturbed me greatly. Juries are not infallible, but we can reduce the likelihood of their erring if we become aroused to his criticism of our legal procedures which leave much to be asked for in terms of that priceless protection of free men—due process. Before reading the book I was convinced that the jury's verdict was correct on both counts. Now on the basis of the accumulation of evidence offered in the book . . . I greatly doubt the correctness of the jury's verdict."

MORRIS L. ERNST, *Saturday Review*

THE STRANGE CASE OF ALGER HISS

by the Right Honorable the Earl Jowitt, former Lord Chancellor and Attorney General of Great Britain

\$3.95 at all booksellers

DOUBLEDAY

Populists to the liberation of Russia's benighted peasants, Mr. Slonim pursues the vicissitudes of the intellectuals to the momentary reconciliation with the masses in the revolutionary effort of 1905, and then through the despondency and repudiation of revolt in the decade which followed. Spurned by the masses during the Revolution as the stigmata of the Tsarist heritage, the intellectuals went their separate ways: many took flight into life-long emigration, others remained behind, some sustained by the legacy of pious hope that in revolution lay national salvation. In the twenties it was this group, in the role of fellow-travelers, which effected the renaissance of Russian literature. Later, during the Five Year Plans, it lent an increasing measure of sincere support to the regime. Decimated by war and purges, it endured to witness the sealing of the centuries-old gulf separating the intellectuals from the masses.

Mr. Slonim's treatment of the latitude of freedom enjoyed by the literati in the twenties is circumspect. He is alert to the inhibiting force of censorship and Communist controls, but notes in fairness that within the confines of this restraint numerous excellent works of literature and scholarship were produced. The relative emancipation of this period emerges in sharp relief when contrasted with the dictatorship of the RAPP (Russian Association of Proletarian Writers) which followed, and with the subsequent centralization of controls under the Union of Soviet Writers. Turning to the new "literature of faith" in the thirties Mr. Slonim discerns that despite the patent decline in artistic standards, literature has assumed such importance in the life of society that it ought properly to be judged less with the relatively new—for Russia—aesthetic criteria of Modernism, and more with the traditional utilitarian yardsticks of the nineteenth century. It is difficult to imagine precisely how Russian literature would have evolved over this period had it been left strictly to its own devices. One suspects, however, that the pervasive tradition of "instructive, useful literature" would spontaneously have generated at least the purposefulness and identification with the masses which characterize Russian writing of the past two decades—without, of course, its manifestly dictated facets.

Mr. Slonim is highly persuasive in his emphasis on the utilitarian tradition. At

the same time, however, he reveals a confident and expert grasp on the intricacies of literary craftsmanship. The chapters on Russian Modernism, in particular the Symbolist Movement, are among the best in the book. Deserving of special note also is the section on emigré literature which does much to fill in one of the lacunae in the Soviet presentation of the history of modern Russian literature. Without succumbing to the temptation of contentiousness, Mr. Slonim has performed a valuable service in restoring the path of Soviet literature to its true perspective, after its prejudiced treatment by Soviet literary historians.

Modern Russian Literature is certain to become a standard authority in the field. It is a highly competent and often exciting presentation of a vast body of literature which opens the way to innumerable insights into the human situation under the Soviets. It demonstrates the sustaining potential of the Russian classical tradition, ready to manifest itself anew "in a beautiful and meaningful blossoming and youth," should the Party but choose to loosen its grip on literary life.

ROBERT M. HANKIN

ASSEMBLY-LINE FABLES

FABLE-MAKING—the spirited treatment of serious matters, such as human folly and self-deception—permits a writer or a moralist the widest possible range of fancy. But it does not permit banality, specious moralizing, or mediocre writing. The art of the fable is therefore

THE WOMAN AS GREAT AS THE WORLD, AND OTHER FABLES, by Jacquetta Hawkes (Random House; \$2.75).

difficult and exacting, for all the latitude allowed by way of conversational animals, birds and fish. The best fables are wonderful tales that speak truth with freshness.

Jacquetta Hawkes is an English archaeologist and anthropologist and author of an admired book, *A Land*. Her fables have a certain glossy quality and proffer their moral points with an air of self-confidence and even of wonder, as though they expressed insights indubitable but heretofore hidden from the mind of man. Some of them might better have remained hidden. One story implies the astonishing moral precept that an offense which has no name ceases to

be an offense. Others have a worn air. *The Couple Who Lived and the Couple Who Died* points out, again, that love changes and lovers grow old, unless they die, in which case neither love nor lovers change (except of course that they are dead). Elsewhere, assembly-line techniques are shown to be ruinous to community life and personality, which will come as no surprise.

To complain of triteness is not to demand a new set of insights; new statements of the most ancient ones would be perfectly acceptable if the images in which they were embodied were excellent simply as works of the imagination. These mainly are not. There is, however, a nice tale of a great salmon who challenges a waterfall, failing and dying, but becoming legendary in his awful effort.

Another story of some princely woodpeckers dispossessed by starlings pleases in the same way. Nature is sensitively observed and described in the most successful of the stories, and the descriptive writing, in a carefully tended and displayed style, is the most reward-wellian tale called *The Unites* is in the aspect of the collection. A long Or-cluded: a picture of the world some centuries hence, occupied by a mankind at last fully declined, in a society organized for the universal distribution of dreariness. The story, or short novel as it actually is, contains some ingenious notions but also a good deal of nonsense, and its dragging length is all too suggestive of the state that it describes.

On the whole, the admirer of fables as such will probably prefer to re-read the instructive adventures of Lord George Hell, or Enoch Soames; or the fables of Kafka; or to revisit the wise and foolish creatures of Aesop and La Fontaine, to say nothing of the Thurber bear, the one Who Could Take It Or Leave It Alone.

S. M. FITZGERALD

Correction

The editors regret that they inadvertently printed David Reisman's review of *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud* (volume 1) by Ernest Jones, M. D. before the publication date of the book, which is to be October 8. The book will be published by Basic Books Incorporated and will be priced \$6.75.

BOOKS IN BRIEF

THE LEGACY OF PERSIA, edited by A. J. Arberry (Oxford; \$4.75).

Another volume in Oxford's "Legacy Series," this collection of articles hands the palm to the Persians for just about everything. None of the essays runs more than forty pages, however, and most of them quite a bit less, so that the chapter headings (Persia and Byzantium, Persia and the Ancient World, et cetera) often appear pretentious and more in order for separate books on the subject. While some of the pieces are extremely engaging and informative, others serve no real purpose, being too technical for the layman and too condescending for the expert. The article on the Persian language, for instance, asks us to "listen to one of the favorite parables of Mani:

'wn c'wn r'zmyrd ky q'myd 'ywn qyrdn 'wd pd xwys d'nysn 'z. . .

"Here," says the author (H. W. Bailey), "the purely Iranian character of the language will at once be noted."

The chapters on carpets, gardens and the "Royame of Perse" are especially well done and worth having the book around. Fifty-three plates (none in color) add ornament.

R. S.

THE ACHIEVEMENT OF D. H. LAWRENCE, edited by Frederick J. Hoffman and Harry T. Moore (Oklahoma; \$4).

This anthology is, in a sense, an apologia, and on two accounts: for all the meretricious writing about Lawrence published before his death, and for the

uneven character of his work itself. T. S. Eliot's observation that he "had to write often badly in order to write sometimes well" seems to be very much in the mind of each of the critics represented here, and, with the exception of F. R. Leavis, is nowhere really refuted.

Practically all of these eighteen essays were written after Lawrence died in 1930, and are excerpted from larger works. Among those devoted to his personality, Aldous Huxley's is the most illuminating; Anthony West and Frank Amon treat the short stories, Horace Gregory and Richard Ellman the poetry, and Edward Nehls the travel books. The European, Catholic view of Lawrence is represented in a study from Sigrid Undset's *Men, Women and Places*.

These sections make the most pleasant reading—the analyses of the novels are harder going and at times somewhat dense, with the exception of Edmund Wilson's delightful piece on *Lady Chatterly's Lover*. Dr. Leavis' ten-page nasty-tempered, petulant critique of Eliot's two-page foreword to Fr. William Tiver-ton's book on Lawrence is rather fun, and a tiny burlesque by Thurber adds a touch of grace between Huxley's profound smile and Eliot's pious scowl. R.S.

Notes on the Critics


FRANCIS BIDDLE is former Attorney General of the United States. MERLE MILLER is the author of *The Judges and the Judged*. ROBERT M. HANKIN is on the faculty of Columbia University. S. M. FITZGERALD reviews regularly for NR.

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From Our Readers

► Religion and the NR

I am completely fed up with those readers who accuse you of being pro- or anti-Catholic, Protestant, or any other religious denomination.

I have been reading the *New Republic* for 10 years, and I have never found any indication of religious prejudice. I have never seen any criticism of any church on matters of faith, dogma or church principles. It is only when a church leaves the realm of religion that it is subject to criticism.

It would be ridiculous to say that when the *New Republic* criticized Father Coughlin it was indication of an anti-Catholic bias. It is equally ridiculous to say that publication of "The Bishop Stood His Ground" (NR, Aug. 3) or "One Fold and One Shepherd" (NR, Aug. 17) indicates a pro-Catholic bent. Bishop Waters is to be congratulated for a fine, brave stand. The NR is to be congratulated for publicizing it, just as it should be constantly congratulated for exposing the evils in our society and encouraging the good.

Articles like the above and like "The Protestant Church Under Fire" are just additional examples of the NR's first-rate, objective reporting.

New York City

FLORENCE REILLY

► National Issues Committee

Particularly because of NR's own enlightening approach to problems of the day, I think your readers may be interested in the National Issues Committee.

Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt is National Chairman of the new, independent, non-partisan organization dedicated to re-defining great issues of the present and future, stating them in simple, understandable terms as objectively as possible and thereby providing the American people with facts necessary for sound judgments and wise decisions.

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NIC is seeking the aid of the best brains in the country on the various issues to be analyzed. For example, Arthur J. Altmeyer heads the subcommittee on social security which will publish a statement shortly.

The National Issues Committee is still in the process of formation but some of its members are: Alan Barth, Charles F. Brannan, Dr. Dorothy B. Ferebee, Mary McLeod Bethune, A. J. Hayes, Leon H. Keyserling, Murray Lincoln, James G. Patton, Robert R. Nathan, Walter P. Reuther and Emil Rieve.

Dan Pryor, until he became NIC's Executive Director, was UNKRA Information Director.

Washington, D. C. CHARLES H. SLAYMAN

► Teachers Continue Fight

It is old news now that the jury awarded a \$55,000 settlement to Fern Bruner, the San Lorenzo high school teacher who was slandered by James Tarantino, a radio commentator, over San Francisco radio station KYA. Twenty-five thousand dollars is to be paid by the station, \$25,000 by Tarantino, and \$5,000 by H. G. Fearnhead, the general manager of the station, for allowing Tarantino to continue reporting that she was a Communist and Communist sympathizer after an investigation found her clear of any such implication. She had asked \$100,123 damages. Now the California teachers face a hectic year from the state Un-American Activities Committee, headed by state Senator Hugh Burns, since the committee recently announced a full program of investigating UNESCO! There are some of us who will "sink or swim" on this issue because we have made a thorough study of UNESCO's worth.

Walnut Creek, Cal.

TOM KENDALL

► The Hiss Case

This is in objection to Merle Miller's review of *The Strange Case of Alger Hiss*. Mr. Miller reproaches Lord Jowett with the inability to write an unprejudiced account, and then, we may assume, sets out to show how it should be done in his review.

First he cites a few very minor, natural, if careless mistakes and surrounds these mistakes with an ominousness that

I take it is supposed to read, "This book is unreliable."

After this rot Mr. Miller treats us to a show of his analytical powers. Mr. Hiss, he tells us, took too long in launching his suit. Now an experienced lawyer might well hesitate at the well-known difficulties and embarrassments of a libel suit. He might have prepared his case before starting the suit, or any of a thousand reason which only Mr. Hiss could know.

From the inconsequential to the silly. It does not matter that Mr. Hiss pressed for the documents that ruined him; after all the FBI had been investigating him for years without finding proof of Mr. Chambers' charges. This reader makes two observations: that the FBI had been investigating him for years without finding him a Communist creates a large presumption that he was not one, and if the basis of Mr. Hiss' conviction was correct, we should have the spy demanding incriminating documents of the man to whom he had given the documents, a most unnatural situation in which the findings of the FBI are of no importance.

Now we pass from the silly to the absurd. That Mr. Hiss' lawyer handed in the typewriter that convicted him is of no importance—it would count more for than against him and the prosecution would have been laughed out of the court, and as for finding it anyway, to paraphrase Judge Murphy, the government turned Washington upside down without seeing the typewriter until Mr. Hiss' attorney brought it to court. It is safe to say they would have had an even tougher time had Mr. Hiss had it destroyed, and the government may even have found it impossible if he had done so with the intelligence of a retarded child. Compare this with Lord Jowett's wise observations of the unnatural stupidity of a spy giving away the incriminating typewriter and finally bringing it to court when the prosecution had found it impossible to locate.

Lord Jowett's account is prejudiced, says Mr. Miller, yet Lord Jowett thoroughly considers the case against Mr. Hiss, while Mr. Miller never gives a word of serious relation or consideration of the impressive case Lord Jowett builds for Mr. Hiss.

Carlisle, Pa.

FELIX ALBERT

I stated in my original review that I believe Alger Hiss was fairly tried and justly convicted; I still think so. I wrote that I believed Lord Jowett had written a silly and inconsequential book; I have not changed my mind. I might have gone much further to prove my point, including such foolish sentences as, "It may

(Continued on page 23)

To Our Readers

In England, Isaiah Berlin told me a story of the isolation of the intellectual in Soviet Russia.

Akhmatova was a leading poet in the earliest years of the revolution. Then she fell from grace. The Soviet press berated her as a rotten bourgeois. Poets' and writers' congresses resolved to expunge her name entirely from Soviet literature. Communist leaders condemned her to oblivion. So she was turned out of her room never to be heard from again.

Years later, after the war, Stalin's daughter, rummaging around among old books, came across the poems of Akhmatova. She was delighted with them. "Daddy," she cried, "whatever became of Akhmatova?"

Stalin frowned: "Akhmatova. . . . Akhmatova?" He picked up a telephone and demanded, "Where is Akhmatova?"

Across the Soviet Union calls were chopped off, long distance lines were cleared, old files were ransacked. Where is Akhmatova? Soon Stalin was told, "She deviated and was sent away."

Stalin shook his head: "We do not treat our proletarian poets in such a way." At once the police were mobilized and the search began. Soon Akhmatova was found and brought back. The Soviet press praised her as a heroine of Soviet literature. Poets' and writers' congresses hailed her as leader and inspirer. Akhmatova listened and nodded. She went back to her room in Moscow with her old belongings brought out of storage.

There Isaiah visited her. The light was poor, the walls were dingy, the furnishings were ancient and ugly. But in the midst of all this, he saw with astonishment on one wall a masterpiece of post-Impressionist painting, a magnificent portrait by Modigliani of a young woman.

"What a nice picture!" he remarked as they drank tea. "Who is it of?" "It's of me!" the old woman sighed happily, "done when I was a girl in Europe, before the war."

"Who did it?" he asked innocently. She smiled:

"Such a nice boy! He was handsome, with curly black hair. He only had one old sweater to wear—he was terribly poor! When he finished the picture he gave it to me for a loaf of bread and a bottle of wine. I never saw him again.

"Modi . . . , Modi . . . , Modigliani was his name," mused Akhmatova. "Amadeo Modigliani! I always wondered what happened to that poor boy."

M. S.

LETTERS

(Continued from page 22)

well be, and I do not pretend to know, that Communists desire the success of Russia and its satellites above that of their own land." In 1953, no less.

I further said that Alger Hiss is a villain; I did not add, although the above letter is ample proof, if proof is necessary, that a number of otherwise intelligent liberals have (for reasons unknown to me but perhaps explainable by any good psychologist) made of Hiss a kind of martyred hero. Alger Hiss is, in my mind, a perjurer and a one-time espionage agent for the Soviet Union, and the sooner we stop trying to find excuses for him, the sooner we can get down to our real business, one of the main aspects of which is, at the moment, to fight Joe McCarthy.

Brewster, N. Y.

MERLE MILLER

Bandwagon

"I have never made charges that members of the Communist Party are on the university faculty," said [Illinois State Senator] Broyles, "but I still say there are ultra-liberals on it."—*From the Chicago Sun-Times, August 4, 1953.*

Mr. and Mrs. Edgar L. Bare who have the Two Bare chinchilla ranch . . . bought a registered pair of very personable chinchillas and named them "Ike" and "Mamie." Mrs. Bare assures us that these are very superior animals—the Bares paid \$2,200 for the two bright-eyed bunches of fine fur. Their first babies were named "Pat" and "Dick" for Whittier's leading citizen, Vice-President Dick Nixon, and his Pat, and succeeding arrivals had to be content with less significant names such as "Martha Washington" and "Betsy Ross."—*From the Whittier News, August 3, 1953.*

According to ancient prophecy, a man named Gog, of the Land of Magog, will bring about the worst war in history. A new book, entitled *Beware of These Days!* reveals that the Land of Magog is Russia, and that "Gog" is an ancient spelling for the name of George. There are several leaders named Georgi now prominent in Russia; so the author warns that any one of them is likely to be the prophesied Gog.—*From the Houston Post, August 4, 1953.*

The first article of the Bill of Rights forbids Congress to make any law "abridging the freedom of speech or of the press." Certainly the suppression or restriction of publication of books, by groups or au-

thorities aside from Congress, is a violation of the spirit if not the letter of this constitutional safeguard of American freedom.—*From the Houston Post, July 1, 1953.*

Residents here have been alarmed for several days by a large cow moose that was seen several times at Victor Muorio farm about two miles northeast of the city.

The moose wandered around in a cow pasture at the farm and caused Mrs. Muorio and her children considerable harassment by chasing them when they attempted to bring the cows in from pasture.

Lawrence Downey, game warden, used a shotgun to frighten the animal away from the farm Sunday. He has not been seen since.—*From the Duluth News-Tribune, June 30, 1953.*

The moral effect on voters of getting unearned subsidies, unearned wages, unearned housing and other unearned "benefits" through unjustified legislation or labor-leader monopolies, is bad. These dangerous practices are basically the reason for increased costs and increased taxes. This same spiritual decadence is also the basic reason for the fall of the stock market averages from 293 in January to about 270 today—some 20 or more points. This is very significant.—*From Roger Babson's column in the Charleston, S. C. News and Courier, July 19, 1953.*

Eight-year-old daughter of a local tycoon, reciting the pledge of allegiance, gives hers "to the flag and to the Bank of America for which it stands."—*From the San Francisco Chronicle, July 19, 1953.*

The G.O.P. [Hawaiian] Senate leader [Benjamin Dillingham, Oahu] declared there are "plenty of jobs" waiting to be filled and added "maybe this will get the able bodied to work. Anyone who says they are entitled to welfare payments is a Socialist."—*From the Honolulu Star-Bulletin.*

Our readers are invited to contribute; \$2 will be paid for each item used. Address Bandwagon, c/o New Republic. Please enclose the original clipping.—THE EDITORS.


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